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British Columbia: 
Crown Land, History and Indigenous 
Religious Freedom 
Howard Kislowicz* and Senwung Luk** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the early 1990s, a ski hill developer proposed a ski resort 
development for an area known by the Ktunaxa Nation as Qat’muk. It is 
an area not covered by any land surrender treaty with Indigenous 
Peoples, but which British Columbia characterized as Crown land. The 
Ktunaxa had not objected to the use of the area for heli-skiing, but they 
objected to the ski resort development. The Supreme Court of Canada 
found that, by 2009, British Columbia had consulted with the Ktunaxa 
and accommodated their concerns by mandating a reduction in the size 
of the proposed resort. 
Also in 2009, the Ktunaxa disclosed that Qat’muk was the home of the 
Grizzly Bear Spirit, which would leave if humans overnighted in the area. 
They said they had not disclosed this information earlier because of its 
secret nature. Despite this new information, by 2011, British Columbia 
decided sufficient consultation had taken place and permitted the resort to 
proceed. The Ktunaxa applied for judicial review of the decision, but were 
unsuccessful at first instance and at the Court of Appeal. At issue was 
whether the Ktunaxa Nation’s religious freedom rights were triggered. The 
Court of Appeal held that the protection of religious freedom did not extend  
                                                                                                                       
* Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Calgary. We are grateful for the helpful 
feedback of Benjamin Berger, Jula Hughes and others at the Osgoode Hall 2017 Constitutional Cases 
Conference, as well as the comments of an anonymous reviewer. 
** Partner, Olthuis Kleer Townshend LLP. Senwung Luk appeared on behalf of the Shibogama 
First Nations Council (“SFNC”) as an intervener in the Ktunaxa Nation case. The views expressed here do 
not necessarily represent those of SFNC. 
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to “restraining and restricting the behaviour of others who do not share that 
belief in the name of preserving subjective religious meaning.”1 
The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada found that section 2(a) of 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms2 did not protect the 
Ktunaxa claim. They reasoned that while the Charter protects the right to 
hold beliefs and manifest those beliefs in worship, it “does not protect the 
spiritual focal point of worship”.3 The concurring minority, in contrast, 
found that the government’s decision infringed the Ktunaxa Nation’s 
religious freedom rights but that the infringement was reasonable.4 
This chapter argues that the exclusion of “spiritual focal points of 
worship” from the ambit of religious freedom could yield strange 
results inconsistent with the purposes of protecting religious freedom. 
This development is likely to have disproportionately onerous effects 
on Indigenous spiritual practices. We highlight these effects by putting 
the issue into the historical context of land grants made by colonial 
powers to dominant religious groups allied with the settler state. Such 
land grants were part of the pattern of colonial dispossession of 
Indigenous groups. We consider how these land grants have privileged 
settler religions, specifically majority settler religions that shared close 
links with the settler state. The effect is that settler religions can protect 
their religious spaces through property law, without having recourse to 
the Charter. 
The framework articulated by the Ktunaxa majority for establishing 
Aboriginal title puts a heavy cost burden on Indigenous groups who may 
want to rely on an ownership claim to protect their land-based religious 
interests. To the extent that Ktunaxa suggests that religious groups in 
need of land to carry out their religious practices should rely on property 
rights rather than religious freedom, the approach privileges dominant 
groups over non-Indigenous religious minorities. As an alternative, we 
suggest that a more appropriate approach to reconciling religious 
freedom interests with the property interests of the Crown or of third 
                                                                                                                       
1 Ktunaxa Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests, Lands and Natural Resource 
Operations), [2015] B.C.J. No. 1682, 2015 BCCA 352, at para. 73 (B.C.C.A.). The framing of the 
effect on the Grizzly Bear Spirit in terms of causing it to “leave” is drawn from the factum of the 
Ktunaxa Nation, which was in turn echoed in the Supreme Court judgment. 
2  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
3  Ktunaxa Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests, Lands and Natural Resource 
Operations), [2017] S.C.J. No. 54, 2017 SCC 54, at para. 71 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ktunaxa SCC”]. 
4  Id. Due to space limitations, we are not able to address the reasoning of the concurring 
judgment in this paper. 
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parties is to be found in the existing case law on the interaction of 
religious freedom and zoning regulations. The reasoning in the zoning 
cases is more conscious of the privilege enjoyed by dominant religions 
and more sensitive of the role that the Charter must play to ensure the 
equal protection of religious freedom in Canada. Finally, we suggest that 
land selection processes under modern treaty negotiations present yet 
another way to avoid conflict. 
II. THE ANALOGY TO PROPERTY AND HISTORICAL PRIVILEGE 
The Ktunaxa claim is challenging in part because it is based in the right 
to religious freedom but resembles a property claim. The Ktunaxa asserted 
their right to limit particular uses of land (overnight sojourns) in territory 
they did not claim to own.5 At first blush, some might bristle at the idea 
that one person’s religious practices could prevent another from using 
property (whether public or private) in an otherwise legal manner. What 
little authority exists on this question has gone against religious freedom 
claimants. For instance, when the users of a spiritual retreat centre opposed 
plans for a department store on neighbouring land, the Ontario Municipal 
Board (“OMB”) held that “freedom of religion does not extend to protect 
religious practices that could be affected by the mere presence of a nearby 
land use”, and the Divisional Court affirmed.6  
Like the OMB, the majority of the Ktunaxa Court held that the 
Ktunaxa claim was beyond the scope of the right to religious freedom. 
Unlike in the OMB case, there was no private landowner in Ktunaxa, 
though the Court reached a similar result on the basis of “public 
interest” in Crown lands. What seems to be driving this rule is a 
concern that an individual or group’s religious freedom interest will 
unjustifiably limit the freedoms of others, especially in relation to their 
property.  
                                                                                                                       
5  For an argument that international law should recognize collective Indigenous ownership 
based in part on religious freedom interests, see Bryan Neihart, “Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua 
Reconsidered: Grounding Indigenous Peoples’ Land Rights in Religious Freedom Case Note” (2013) 
42 Denv. J. Int’l. Law & Pol’y [i]. The analogy to property is not perfect: “Property is inherently 
fungible in ways that sacred sites are not. To argue for property rights is to argue for something different 
than arguing for protection of the sacred, even if property rights might ultimately be a vehicle for that 
protection”: Dwight Newman, “Implications of the Ktunaxa Nation / Jumbo Valley Case for Religious 
Freedom Jurisprudence” in Religious Freedom and Communities (Toronto: LexisNexis Canada, 2016) 
309, at 315 [hereinafter “Newman”]. 
6  Residents for Sustainable Development in Guelph v. 6 & 7 Developments Ltd., [2005] 
O.J. No. 3623, 133 C.R.R. (2d) 205, at para. 17 (Ont. Div. Ct.). 
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For instance, if I believe that a Bible is a sacred object, that should not 
prevent another person from expressing their opposition to treating the 
object as sacred. I could not seek an injunction against someone who sought 
publicly to destroy a Bible as an act of protest on the basis of my own 
religious freedom. While I cannot stop you from destroying your Bible, I can 
stop you from destroying my Bible — not because of my religious freedom, 
but because of my property right in the Bible. And this is the nub of the 
majority’s reasoning: they do not want the religious freedom right, 
exercisable against the state, to be transformed into a species of property 
right, exercisable against all. While this may have a certain logical appeal, it 
also reveals the disproportionate impact of the Ktunaxa holding on 
Indigenous groups whose rights to the land are never presumed, but instead 
must be proven through lengthy and expensive litigation. This 
disproportionate impact seems especially pernicious given that Indigenous 
religious practices were long outlawed and subject to the state’s attempts to 
“exterminate [them] … through the devastating system of Indian residential 
schools.”7 For much of the 20th century, engaging in certain Indigenous 
spiritual ceremonies was a statutory offence under the Indian Act.8  
In contrast, to the extent that dominant religious groups in Canada 
have any beliefs in the sacredness of a church or burial site, they will not 
likely need to rely on a religious freedom right to protect these lands, 
because they already own them.9 A good deal of those ownership rights 
can be traced to grants from the relevant state actors, resulting in a 
history of state-bestowed privilege relative to minority religious groups. 
To illustrate, the rest of this section examines some of the large initial 
land grants made by the French Crown to Catholic groups in New France 
and by the English Crown to Protestant groups in Upper Canada.10 
1. New France Land Grants/Settlement 
The relationship between the French Crown and the Catholic Church 
was close, and the Catholic Church and various Catholic religious orders 
                                                                                                                       
7  Natasha Bakht & Lynda Collins, “‘The Earth is Our Mother’: Freedom of Religion and 
the Preservation of Indigenous Sacred Sites in Canada” (2017) 62:3 McGill L.J. 777, at 791 
[hereinafter “Bakht & Collins”]. 
8  Indian Act, R.S.C. 1927, c. 98, s. 140. 
9  Newman, supra, note 5, at 314. 
10  We rely in this section on secondary materials because our purpose here is to make these 
histories known to those with an interest in law; we do not claim to have conducted original 
historical research. 
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played a large role in the settlement of New France. The “established 
churches aided the state in upholding order” and “the state used its power 
to back the authority of religious officials, establishing parishes, 
enforcing the collection of the tithe, and maintaining order at church 
ceremonies.”11 Reflecting the overlapping interests of religion and state, 
the Jesuits made efforts to attract new settlers.12 Though there was some 
competition for influence between church and state officials,13 “Church 
and state were not normally at variance in their views and aims.”14 
The Church’s recognition of the state’s authority was often “a help rather 
than an obstacle to the Church”, as the state enforced religious dogma 
and provided financial support to the Church.15  
(a)  Land Grants/Settlement 
In return for their role in colonization, religious orders in New France 
were often the beneficiaries of large land grants from the French Crown. 
In the first half of the 17th century, when the Compagnie des Cent-
Associés held the grant of New France, it attracted a small agricultural 
population made up in part of “servants indentured to the Jesuits, 
Ursulines, or nursing sisters” and those who came “to the model 
Christian community established at Montreal in 1642 by the Société de 
Notre-Dame pour la conversion des sauvages”.16 The Compagnie “gave 
the Jesuits huge seigneuries”.17 When the Compagnie surrendered its 
charter in 1663, the French state continued to make many large land 
grants to churches and religious orders to “maintain the social position of 
the clergy”.18 As historian Marcel Trudel notes, “one quarter of the 
7,985,470 acres granted during the French régime were given to  
the Church,” leaving the Church (including the religious orders) as the 
largest landowner in New France.19 Trudel notes, however, that much  
                                                                                                                       
11  John A. Dickinson & Brian Young, A Short History of Quebec, 4th ed. (Montréal; Ithaca: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2008), at 29 [hereinafter “Dickinson & Young”]. 
12  Émile Salone, La Colonisation de la Nouvelle-France, 3d ed. (Paris: Librairie Orientale 
& Américaine, 1960), at 66 [hereinafter “Salone”]. 
13  Marcel Trudel, Introduction to New France (Toronto: Holt, Rinehard and Winston of 
Canada, 1968), at 257 [hereinafter “Trudel, Introduction to New France”]. 
14  William Bennett Munro, Crusaders of New France: A Chronicle of the Fleur-de-Lis in 
the Wilderness (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1920), at 127 [hereinafter “Munro”]. 
15  Trudel, Introduction to New France, supra, note 13, at 258. 
16  Dickinson & Young, supra, note 11, at 22. 
17  Id., at 41. 
18  Id. 
19  See Munro, supra, note 14, at 128. 
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of this land was given to religious orders who “held a social mandate 
from the state for both education and hospitalization”20 (see Figure 1). 
The French Crown ended its practice of granting land to religious 
communities in the 18th century, at which point religious communities in 
need of land had to buy it, but those that already held property retained 
ownership.21  
 
Figure 1: Seignorial distribution in New France, circa 1745, with 
Church-held seigneuries in dark grey.22  
Though control of the land that is present-day Québec passed from 
the French to the British with the Conquest of the 1760s, “the institutions 
introduced by France remained and were confirmed by the Quebec Act 
of 1774”.23 French colonists kept their property, and the terms of  
the 1760 Capitulations of Quebec and Montreal specifically allowed the 
religious orders to retain their property.24 One major exception was the 
Jesuit Order, which saw itself dismantled and its land taken by the British 
Crown.25 This had mostly to do with the Jesuits falling out of favour in  
 
 
                                                                                                                       
20  Marcel Trudel, The Seigneurial Regime (Hull: Canadian Historical Association, 1956), at 
5-6 [hereinafter “Trudel, The Seigneurial Regime”]. 
21  Trudel, Introduction to New France, supra, note 13, at 179. 
22  Service national du RÉCIT de l’univers social, map adapted from Serge Courville, Le 
Québec : Genèses et mutations du territoire (Québec: Presses de l’Université Laval, 2000), at 115, 
online: <http://images.recitus.qc.ca/main.php?g2_itemId=2588>. 
23  Serge Courville & Richard Howard, Quebec: A Historical Geography (Vancouver: 
University of British Columbia Press, 2008), at 103. 
24  Roy Clinton Dalton, The Jesuits’ Estates Question, 1760-1888: A Study of the 
Background for the Agitation of 1889 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968), at 4 [hereinafter 
“Dalton”]. 
25  Dickinson & Young, supra, note 11, at 42-43. 
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Europe with both the French and Spanish Crowns, who respectively 
suppressed and expelled the Jesuits in the 1760s, during which time the 
number of Jesuits in Canada declined.26 There was debate among the 
British on how to handle the Jesuit properties in the 1760s,27 but by 1775 
the Governor of Quebec received specific orders “that the Jesuits’ 
Society be dissolved and suppressed and that their estates and other 
possessions be vested in the Crown”.28 The Jesuits were eventually 
compensated through the Act Respecting the settlement of the Jesuits’ 
Estates, which compensated the Jesuits in the amount of $400,000 for 
their lands.29 
(b)  Montreal 
Looking at Catholic involvement in one particular place showcases 
the interconnectedness of religion and colonization. Montreal, the largest 
city in Quebec, owes its foundation to “la propagande des Jésuites”.30 
Initially, the Jesuits were given lands constituting 11.2 per cent of the 
City, with the Bishop and Seminary of Quebec receiving 8.7 per cent, the 
Sulpicians 3.1 per cent, and the Grey Sisters receiving 0.5 per cent.31  
The Sulpicians soon became the leading religious order in the city, 
having been “conceived almost simultaneously [with the city] in the 
mind of the seventeenth-century French theologian, Jean-Jacques Olier 
de Verneuil ... [who] became the principal supporter of La Compagnie de 
Notre-Dame de Mont-Réal”.32 In 1641, Louis XIII gave this Compagnie  
“the right to occupy Mont-Réal”, and they built “the first wooden church 
of Notre-Dame. In 1644 Jeanne Mance chose a spot two hundred yards 
inland for the site of the Hôtel-Dieu hospital. This move established the 
first two streets of Montreal.”33 
                                                                                                                       
26  Dalton, supra, note 24, at 5-6. 
27  Id., at 5-7. 
28  Id., at 19. 
29  Id., at 162-63. Act Respecting the settlement of the Jesuits’ Estates, 51-52 Vict., c. 13. 
30  Salone, supra, note 12, at 73. 
31  Trudel, The Seigneurial Regime, supra, note 20, at 6. 
32  Franklin Toker, The Church of Notre-Dame in Montreal: An Architectural History, 2d 
ed. (Montreal; Buffalo: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1991), at 5-6 [hereinafter “Toker”]. 
33  Id. 
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The city’s growth proved slow in its first decade. “Sulpician priests 
arrived in New France in 1657 in response to an urgent request from 
Maisonneuve and Jeanne Mance, and established their first seminary.”34 
Louis XIV then allowed the Paris Seminary of Saint-Sulpice “to buy the 
entire island of Montreal from its previous owners, the mercantile 
Compagnie des Cent-Associés”.35 In 1663, consistent with the wishes of 
settlers in Montreal,36 the Sulpicians became the Seigneurs de 
Montréal.37 This position obligated them to administer the city and 
entitled them to payments from the island’s other residents. “Montreal 
was one of the largest and certainly the richest seigniory in the colony, 
and one of the few owned outright by a religious community.”38 The 
Sulpicians established missions to spread their message to Indigenous 
Peoples, and engaged in planning out the city, creating a street grid and 
building a parish church, among other things.39 As Seigneurs, the 
Sulpicians were able to choose their preferred lands.40 They remained the 
Seigneurs of Montreal until the British conquest in 1760;41 as noted 
above, however, most religious orders in Lower Canada were allowed  
to retain their property under the terms of the Capitulation Treaties. 
The chapel of Notre-Dame-de-Bonsecours, for example, has been on the 
same land since 1675.42  
2. Upper Canada 
The history of the relationship between Protestant Christian 
denominations and the state authorities of Upper Canada is comparable 
to that of New France in many ways. First, the state used its claims to  
 
 
                                                                                                                       
34  Louise Pothier, “Ville-Marie: A French and Amerindian Town 1642-1685” in Gilles 
Lauzon & Madeleine Forget, eds., Old Montreal: History through Heritage (Sainte-Foy: 
Publications du Québec, 2004) 27, at 38 [hereinafter “Pothier”]. 
35  Toker, supra, note 32, at 7. 
36  Cornelius J. Jaenen, The Role of the Church in New France (Toronto: McGraw-Hill 
Ryerson, 1976), at 19. 
37  Toker, supra, note 32, at 7. 
38  Id. 
39  Pothier, supra, note 34, at 42. 
40  Id., at 49. 
41  Toker, supra, note 32, at 7. 
42  “Head back through time! History of Montreal’s oldest chapel – Marguerite Bourgeoys 
Museum & Notre-Dame-de-Bon-Secours Chapel”, online: <http://www.marguerite-bourgeoys.com/ 
en/chapel/history.asp>. 
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landownership to enrich Protestant institutions and to provide them 
with the material conditions for establishing themselves and for 
expansion. Although New France was dominated by one denomination, 
in Upper Canada different Protestant denominations struggled with the 
dominance of the Church of England (Anglicanism), to which members 
of the governing class mostly belonged.  
What follows is a discussion of the allocation of land by the settler 
government to Protestant churches in the foundational years of the colony of 
Upper Canada. Then, a specific example of one church, the Anglican 
Cathedral Church of St. James in Toronto, will demonstrate how one 
Anglican community came to have its right to a sacred space recognized in 
Canadian law. 
(a)  Lands Reserved for the Protestant Clergy 
One-seventh of all land open for settlement in Upper Canada was 
made, by law, the property of the Protestant churches of the province. 
This can be attributed at least in part to the way in which the colony was 
conceived. The idea of the British colony of Upper Canada arose in the 
aftermath of the American War of Independence. In reaction to the 
rhetoric of democracy and equality that the American revolutionaries had 
used to rally British colonists in the Thirteen Colonies, the founders of 
the Upper Canada colony sought to build a society where everybody 
knew their place — and the Anglican Church was to have a central place 
in this process. Such an ideology was explicitly embraced in the Crown’s 
instructions to Governor James Murray, “to the end that the Church of 
England may be established … and that the said inhabitants may … be 
induced to embrace the Protestant religion … land would be set aside for 
the support of Protestant ministers and school masters”.43  
From an English perspective, the most familiar role for the Anglican 
Church would have been for it to be the “established church”, just as it 
was (and is) in England, where the head of the Church and the head of 





                                                                                                                       
43  Instructions to Murray, cited in Lillian F. Gates, Land Policies of Upper Canada 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968), at 196. 
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England has its own system of laws and courts whose jurisdiction is 
recognized by the civil courts.44 The civil courts also recognize the power 
of Church of England bishops to declare that certain parcels of land are 
under the jurisdiction of Church law, and therefore no longer under the 
jurisdiction of the common law.45 In the intimate relationship between 
the state and an established church, a mutual regard for each other’s 
interests can be expected. 
In the aftermath of the American War of Independence, with the 
British desire to build a new society that was more respectful of rank, the 
Anglican Church sought to take charge of this process by becoming the 
established church of the new colony. By endowing the Anglican Church 
with property and power, the founders of Upper Canada sought to use it 
to promote social stability.46 
Thus, the Constitutional Act 1791, the first constitutional document of 
the government of Ontario, was made to ensure special privileges for the 
religion of the new settlers. The relevant part of the Act begins with a 
reference to the privileges that the Roman Catholic Church would enjoy in 
Lower Canada, then declares “that it should be lawful for his Majesty … to 
make such Provision out of the rest of the said accustomed Dues and Rights, 
for the Encouragement of the Protestant Religion, and for the Maintenance 
and Support of a Protestant Clergy within the said Province …”.47  
The privilege accorded to the Roman Catholic Church in Lower Canada thus 
became a justification for the privileges to be accorded to the Protestant 
churches in Upper Canada.  
 
                                                                                                                       
44  See generally, E. Garth Moore, An Introduction to English Canon Law (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1967), at 125 [hereinafter “Moore”]. See also Senwung Luk, “The Law of the 
Land: New Jurisprudence on Aboriginal Title” (2014) 67 S.C.L.R. (2d) 289, at 309ff. 
45  Re St. John’s, Chelsea, [1962] 2 All E.R. 850, at 852 (Cons. Ct.); Moore, id., at 97-100; 
Mark Hill, Ecclesiastical Law, 3d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), at 261-63. 
46  Carl Benn, “A Georgian Parish 1797-1839” [hereinafter “Benn”] in William Cooke, ed., 
The Parish and Cathedral of St. James’, Toronto, 1797-1997 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1998), at 3 [hereinafter “Cooke”]. 
47  Constitutional Act, 1791, s. 35. 
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Figure 2: Illustrative plan for the implementation of the clergy 
reserves. Source: Gates, supra, note 43. 
The next section of the Constitutional Act, 1791 announced the royal 
intention to permanently appropriate lands to the Protestant clergy in 
proportion to the previous grants, and authorized further such 
appropriations in the future. Further, the Act provided that where land 
grants were made in the future, “there shall at the same Time be made, in 
respect of the same, a proportionable Allotment and Appropriation of 
Lands” to the Protestant clergy, thus maintaining the Protestant clergy’s 
one-seventh ownership of land in Upper Canada (see Figure 2).48 Protestant 
churches would use such lands for church construction, or to rent out to  
 
                                                                                                                       
48  Id., s. 36. 
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tenant farmers so that funds could be raised to pay for the operation of the 
Protestant Church. The income from these “glebe lands” was dedicated to 
the financing of a particular Protestant church community. 
Because the Constitutional Act, 1791 provided that these lands were 
for the support of a “Protestant Clergy” and did not further specify that 
the lands would belong specifically to the Anglican Church, the debate 
over who the “true owners” of these clergy reserves were — Anglicans, 
or other Protestant denominations such as Presbyterians, Methodists and 
Baptists — beset Upper Canada politics for decades.49 For instance, 
Lieutenant Governor Sir John Colborne endowed 44 Anglican rectories 
in Upper Canada with glebes taken from the Crown and clergy reserves 
in 1836, to the dismay of other Protestant denominations who were not 
favoured with such largesse.50 
The clergy reserves were finally secularized by Act of Parliament in 
1854, which stipulated that the lands which remained in 1854 were to be 
sold and the funds raised divided among the municipalities of the 
province.51 By 1854, however, about 75 per cent of the clergy reserves 
had already been sold or otherwise disposed for the benefit of the 
Protestant churches, leaving the Protestant churches with a large 
endowment.52 
(b)  St. James Cathedral, Toronto 
Although the British settlement of York (Toronto) began in the early 
1790s, an Anglican Church was not built in the town until 1807.53 
This Anglican Church eventually became the Cathedral Church of St. 
James, but at the time was called the “Episcopal Church at York”.54  
In the 15 years prior to the construction of this first church, British 
settlers worshipped in a variety of government buildings, including the 
military headquarters at Fort York, the town jail, and the Parliament 
Buildings.55 This fluidity of places of worship of Protestants of early 
Toronto may be a sign of how tightly woven the colonial state of Upper 
Canada was to Protestant Christianity. 
                                                                                                                       
49  Gates, supra, note 43, at ch. 15 and 17. 
50  Benn, supra, note 46, at 20. 
51  Gates, supra, note 43, at 251. 
52  Id., at 252. 
53  Benn, supra, note 46, at 47-48. 
54  Id. 
55  Id., at 4-7. 
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The land on which St. James Cathedral was built was granted by the 
settler government of Upper Canada to the Anglican Church in 1797. Six 
acres northwest of what is now the corner of King and Jarvis Streets were 
given to the Church.56 Although the Church buildings themselves would not 
take up so much land, the rest of the land was glebe land and could be rented 
out or sold to provide financing for the construction of church buildings and 
operations.57 The parish church would then charge parishioners “ground 
rent” for the land on which their pews stood,58 thus deriving further income 
from land received from the government for free. 
The government of Upper Canada provided financial assistance to 
the Anglican community in other ways. It paid for part of the salaries of 
the Anglican priest59 and the Anglican chaplaincy of the military and of 
the legislative council.60 It subsidized the construction of St. James 
Church, as well as that of the parsonage and rectory.61 When the 
government was gifting Protestant communities with glebe lands,  
St. James Cathedral received 800 acres, four times the usual 
allotment.62 St. James Cathedral also owned urban land, in what is now 
the east side of downtown Toronto.63 Glebe rent, along with other 
government moneys, was the predominant source of funding for the 
salary paid to Bishop John Strachan during his tenure as Anglican 
Bishop of Toronto.64  
                                                                                                                       
56  Id., at 6. 
57  Alan Hayes, “The Making of an Evangelical Cathedral, 1839-1883” [hereinafter “Hayes”] 
in Cooke, supra, note 46, at 46. 
58  Id., at 47. 
59  Benn, supra, note 46, at 9. 
60  Id., at 14. 
61  Id., at 9. 
62  Id., at 20. 
63  Hayes, supra, note 57, at 48. 
64  Id., at 41. The historical practice of the Canadian state has advantaged dominant settler 
religions relative to other minority religious groups as well. City plans are drawn around existing 
churches and cemeteries, while other groups have to fit their religious needs into existing municipal 
plans. A recent example occurred in Saint-Apollinaire, a small municipality near Quebec City. 
Members of the Quebec Islamic Cultural Centre were denied the zoning approvals required for a 
planned Muslim cemetery. Though the community eventually found an alternative solution with the 
support of Quebec’s Premier and Quebec City’s mayor, the events highlight how land-based interests of 
minority religious communities remain contingent on political support, while dominant groups can rely 
on property rights instead. Dia Dabby & Lori G. Beaman, “Diversity in death: A case study of a Muslim 
cemetery project in Quebec” in Russell Sandberg, ed., Interdisciplinary Approaches to Law and 
Religion (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, forthcoming). 
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III. UNEQUAL EFFECTS OF KTUNAXA ON  
INDIGENOUS SPIRITUALITY 
On the face of the pre-Ktunaxa Supreme Court of Canada case law, it 
seemed that if the Ktunaxa Nation could prove their beliefs were sincere, 
they had a fairly strong case for demonstrating an infringement of 
religious freedom. The test for infringement of the right of religious 
freedom has been relatively stable since 2004. A claimant must establish 
(1) a sincere belief that (2) a practice or belief has a nexus with religion 
and (3) that some state action has interfered in a non-trivial way with 
their ability to act in accordance with the belief or practice.65 The 
Ktunaxa Nation claimed a sincere belief that their religious practices 
would be rendered meaningless if the Minister were to allow the ski hill 
to be developed as proposed. There is arguably some subtext in the 
majority decision that questions the sincerity of the Ktunaxa Nation,66 
but that was not the basis for the decision. Instead, the majority held that 
the Ktunaxa claim was outside the ambit of section 2(a): 
The state’s duty under s. 2(a) is not to protect the object of beliefs, such 
as Grizzly Bear Spirit ... the Charter protects the freedom to worship, 
but does not protect the spiritual focal point of worship ... the 
appellants are not seeking protection for the freedom to believe in 
Grizzly Bear Spirit or to pursue practices related to it. Rather, they seek 
to protect Grizzly Bear Spirit itself and the subjective spiritual meaning 
they derive from it. That claim is beyond the scope of s. 2(a).67 
This development strikes us as likely to have a disproportionate 
impact on Indigenous spiritual beliefs relating to the sacredness of 
particular lands. As Natasha Bakht and Lynda Collins note, “one aspect 
of Indigenous cosmology that appears to transcend cultural and 
geographic boundaries is the veneration of certain natural areas as sacred 
sites.”68 Indigenous Peoples are also more likely than settler Canadians to 
have ancestors whose remains rest in specific locations within Canada. 
                                                                                                                       
65  See, e.g., Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, [2004] S.C.J. No. 46, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551, at 
paras. 56-59 (S.C.C.); Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, [2006] S.C.J. No. 6, 
[2006] 1 S.C.R. 256, at para. 34 (S.C.C.). 
66  See Ktunaxa SCC, supra, note 3, at paras. 30, 34-36. 
67  Id., at para. 71 (emphasis added). 
68  Bakht & Collins, supra, note 7, at 779. 
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Such locations are considered sacred in many cultures and call for 
protection under Indigenous legal traditions.69 
As such, Indigenous groups are far more likely to have religious 
practices tied to specific sites, which means that their “spiritual focal 
point of worship” is more likely to exist in the physical world and be 
subject to physical harms. One way to illustrate this is by asking what the 
“spiritual focal point of worship” is in other religious traditions. For 
many religious traditions with beliefs in an omnipotent god, that god is 
the focal point of worship. The majority’s approach implies that the state 
is under no obligation to protect that god, but that the state must justify 
infringements of a person’s ability to worship that god. Prohibitions on 
particular rituals, such as carrying a kirpan, must be justified, but if the 
state proposed to murder a god, this would not qualify as an infringement 
of religious freedom. The problem is that for Abrahamic faiths the 
possibility of killing a god is nonsensical because of the way that god is 
understood by most believers (at least in the present era).70 For most ritual 
purposes, it matters very little to Christians or Jews whether section 2(a) 
protects the spiritual focal point of their worship. It only matters for 
those with religious views like the Ktunaxa Nation, who believe that the 
actions of others can have spiritual consequences for themselves.71  
The Ktunaxa holding thus adds to the picture of which forms of 
religion are tolerable in the culture of Canadian constitutionalism. 
Benjamin Berger has argued that the Supreme Court’s case law on 
religious freedom sends the message that certain forms of religion are 
more compatible with the basic commitments of Canadian constitutional 
culture.72 This culture, writes Berger, understands religion as private, a 
matter of choice, and primarily individual. The Ktunaxa claim meets all 
these obstacles. That the claim attached to decision-making about Crown 
land brought the religious commitments into the public sphere. That the 
actions of others might have spiritual consequences for the Ktunaxa 
                                                                                                                       
69  Darlene Johnston, “Respecting and Protecting the Sacred”, paper prepared for the 
Ipperwash Inquiry (Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney General, 2006), at 6; Hiawatha First Nation v. 
Ontario (Minister of the Environment), [2007] O.J. No. 506, 221 O.A.C. 113, at para. 45 (Ont. Div. 
Ct.); John Borrows, “Living Law on Living Earth” in Canada’s Indigenous Constitution (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2010), at 246-47; Michael Lee Ross, First Nations Sacred Sites in 
Canada’s Courts (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2005), at 53. 
70  For many Christians, it is a tenet of their religious belief that the Roman state did in fact 
kill God, who incarnated in the form Jesus and lived among humans for 33 years. 
71  See David Williams & Susan Williams, “Volitionalism and Religious Liberty” (1991) 
76:4 Cornell L. Rev. 769. 
72  Benjamin L. Berger, Law’s Religion: Religious Difference and the Claims of 
Constitutionalism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015). 
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treats religion as not only about a person’s own choices. That the claim 
was brought in the name of the Nation made it a fundamentally collective 
claim.73 Ktunaxa can also be seen as demonstrating two further aspects 
of the Supreme Court’s understanding of religion. First, by separating the 
ritual from the object of the ritual, the Court showed a preference for 
religious practices that are not grounded in the material world, 
emphasizing a separation between the physical and spiritual. Second, the 
Ktunaxa claim troubles basic commitments of state sovereignty. The 
Ktunaxa argued that their religious beliefs created a limit on how others 
can behave, which threatened to occupy some of the state’s role as the 
producer of rules that bind others.74 
Looked at from the other direction, the conception of religious practice 
as private is also a form of privilege for dominant settler religions. 
Ironically, it is precisely because of public acts by the state, such as the 
endowment with choice lands and material resources as described by this 
paper, that these groups can make claims through private law concepts of 
property rather than public law concepts of religious freedom. Interlopers 
in the St. James Cathedral sacristy can be evicted as trespassers; no 
explanation of the sacristy as sacred space and the effects of interlopers on 
Anglican religious practice, and no appeal to section 2(a), need be made. 
The likely unequal effects of the Ktunaxa Court’s approach suggest that 
it has charted a path for religious freedom inconsistent with the Charter’s 
own admonition that it be interpreted “in a manner consistent with the 
preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians”.75 
Since the early religious freedom jurisprudence under the Charter, the 
Supreme Court has held that part of the idea of religious freedom is that all 
should be equally free. In Dickson J.’s (as he then was) words: 
A truly free society is one which can accommodate a wide variety of 
beliefs, diversity of tastes and pursuits, customs and codes of conduct. 
A free society is one which aims at equality with respect to the 
enjoyment of fundamental freedoms and I say this without any reliance 
                                                                                                                       
73  We note that the Supreme Court has shown movement towards accepting such claims in 
its more recent jurisprudence: Loyola High School v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 12, 
2015 SCC 12, at paras. 59-61, 92-94 (S.C.C.) [herinafter “Loyola”]. 
74  See Benjamin L. Berger, “Liberal Constitutionalism and the Unsettling of the Secular” in 
Rex Ahdar, ed., Research Handbook on Law and Religion (Camberley: Edward Elgar Publishing, 
forthcoming 2018). 
75  Supra, note 2, s. 27. 
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upon s. 15 of the Charter. Freedom must surely be founded in respect 
for the inherent dignity and the inviolable rights of the human person.76 
The Charter protects religious freedom because when the state 
unreasonably restricts the religious freedom of an individual or group, or 
unreasonably requires a person to act contrary to their conscientious 
beliefs,77 it does not treat them with the respect and concern demanded 
by their inherent dignity. And since all humans possess that inherent 
dignity in equal measure, all must have equal access to the protections of 
religious freedom. 
The Supreme Court’s more recent jurisprudence on the state’s 
obligations of religious neutrality flow from the same idea.78 This is in part 
because the Court has found that the guarantee of religious freedom 
includes a duty of religious neutrality, which “requires that the state treat 
religious belief systems in an equal or even-handed manner — that it 
remain neutral in religious matters”.79 Richard Moon argues that the 
Court’s religious neutrality jurisprudence is motivated in part by its dual-
faceted understanding of religion. “While religious commitment is 
sometimes described by the courts as a personal choice or … it is also, or 
sometimes instead, described as a central element of the individual’s 
identity.”80 On the latter account, “a judgment by the state that [a person’s] 
beliefs or practices are less important or less true than others may be 
experienced as a denial of his equal worth”.81  
There are those who say that this argumentative manoeuvre confuses 
freedom with equality and leads to bad results. Mary Anne Waldron 
argues that, given the separate constitutional and quasi-constitutional 
protections of equality, freedom of conscience and religion cannot be 
justified on equality grounds alone.82 In her view, the Court has failed to 
justify how “a preference given to one religion could be, without more, a 
violation of freedom of religion”.83  
                                                                                                                       
76  R. v. Big M Drug Mart, [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at para. 94 (S.C.C.) 
(emphasis added). 
77  Id., at para. 121. 
78  See Mouvement laïque québécois v. Saguenay (City), [2015] S.C.J. No. 16, 2015 SCC 16 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Saguenay”]; Richard Moon, Freedom of Conscience and Religion (Toronto: 
Irwin Law, 2014), at 10-11 [hereinafter “Moon”]. 
79  Moon, id., at xiii. 
80  Id., at 20. 
81  Id. 
82  Mary Anne Waldron, Free to Believe: Rethinking Freedom of Conscience and Religion 
in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013), at 72. 
83  Id., at 42. 
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Unlike Waldron, we think the Court’s analysis on religious neutrality 
and equality is basically sound. Though the purpose of section 2(a) is not 
to combat discrimination, part of being a religiously free society means 
that no one’s choices are unreasonably constrained, as compared to 
others’ choices, by the interaction of their religious practices and state 
actions. Nevertheless, even if Waldron is correct that treating religious 
freedom as derived from equality amounts to a category mistake, the 
right of religious freedom must be agnostic about religious truth. A 
religious freedom right could hardly live up to its name if it applied only 
to Christian or monotheistic religions. Accordingly, when courts narrow 
the ambit of the religious freedom right such that it is likely to disfavour 
groups with particular sorts of spiritual commitments (i.e., the belief in 
the sacredness of particular places), the jurisdiction is less religiously 
free than it might have been.  
A set of cases showing how the obligation of state religious neutrality 
applies at the intersection of religious freedom and property rights 
involves claims against municipal zoning by-laws. These cases illustrate 
a way for the courts to engage in interest-balancing in the context of land 
use disputes that better acknowledges the constitutional importance of 
religious belief. In such cases, a religious community typically owns 
property in a city that it wishes to use in a manner not permitted by the 
zoning rules, such as opening a place of worship in a residentially zoned 
area. Admittedly, there is an important contrast between these cases and 
Ktunaxa, in which the relevant community did not make a claim to 
exclusive occupation of the land. That said, zoning laws generally 
operate in the interest of the municipal community. They seek to 
harmonize the needs of private property owners, which may conflict, as 
well as the use of public property. Zoning rules operate to limit property 
rights in the name of the public good, as determined by municipal 
representatives. When religious communities challenge such rules, they 
effectively argue that their religious interests outweigh the public interest 
as articulated in a zoning by-law. If you owned a home adjacent to a 
proposed house of worship, you may feel that allowing for an exception 
to a residentially zoned area negatively impacts your property value and 
your ability to enjoy your property. The state, in evaluating such 
competing claims, is obliged to decide in accordance with Charter 
values.  
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The Court was faced with such a zoning case in Congrégation des 
témoins de Jéhovah de St-Jérôme-Lafontaine v. Lafontaine (Village).84  
A congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses sought to establish a Kingdom 
Hall but believed there was no suitably zoned land available for 
purchase. The congregation made an offer to purchase property in a 
residential zone conditional on obtaining a variance to the zoning by-law. 
The municipality refused the congregation’s request for the variance, 
explaining that the variance “would result in increased property taxes for 
neighbouring residents”.85 The congregation continued to search for 
properly zoned land but, when it concluded there was none available, 
made a new offer on land in a commercial zone conditional, again, on 
obtaining a zoning variance. This time, the municipality refused the 
request with no reasons. The congregation renewed its search, which 
again proved fruitless, and applied to the municipality for a variance a 
third time. This application was also refused, again without reasons.  
When the Congregation sought a remedy from the Québec Superior 
Court,86 the Court found as fact that there were parcels of land available 
for sale in the appropriately zoned area, and held in favour of the 
municipality principally on this basis. At the Supreme Court, the majority 
of the Court allowed the congregation’s appeal, but on administrative law 
rather than Charter grounds.87  
The dissenting judgment of LeBel J. is of more interest for present 
purposes, as it addresses the congregation’s religious freedom claim. 
Justice LeBel held that because there was land available for purchase in 
the appropriately zoned area, there was no religious freedom violation.88 
However, he also offered an analysis of the state’s duty of religious 
neutrality and what it requires of municipalities with respect to zoning 
for places of worship.  
Although the case pre-dates the Doré89 Charter values framework, we 
think LeBel J.’s approach illustrates how such an analysis can be done. In 
LeBel J.’s view, public authorities have “a duty of religious neutrality 
that assures individual or collective tolerance, thereby safeguarding the 
dignity of every individual and ensuring equality for all”.90 Christian 
                                                                                                                       
84  [2004] S.C.J. No. 45, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 650 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Lafontaine”]. 
85  Id., at para. 19. 
86  Congrégation des Témoins de Jéhovah de St-Jérôme-Lafontaine c. Lafontaine 
(Municipalité du village), [1998] J.Q. no 5531 (Que. C.S.). 
87  Lafontaine, supra, note 84, at para. 23. 
88  Id., at para. 72 (LeBel J., dissenting). 
89  Doré v. Barreau du Québec, [2012] S.C.J. No. 12, 2012 SCC 12 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Doré”]. 
90  Lafontaine, supra, note 84, at para. 65. 
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settlers in Canada lived under a system in which the state was aligned 
with a particular church. However, “social realities prompted 
governments to give official recognition to the status and role of the 
Catholic church and various Protestant denominations. … Thus, at the 
time of Confederation in 1867, the concept of religious neutrality implied 
primarily respect for Christian denominations.”91 Over time, “the 
appearance and growing influence of new philosophical, political and 
legal theories on the organization and bases of civil society have 
gradually led to a dissociation of the functions of church and state”, with 
changing demographics, industrialization and urbanization all playing a 
role in this process.92 The result is that 
it is no longer the state’s place to give active support to any one 
particular religion, if only to avoid interfering in the religious practices 
of the religion’s members. The state must respect a variety of faiths 
whose values are not always easily reconciled. … [The state] is limited 
to setting up a social and legal framework in which beliefs are 
respected and members of the various denominations are able to 
associate freely in order to exercise their freedom of worship, which is 
a fundamental, collective aspect of freedom of religion, and to organize 
their churches or communities.93 
When applied in the context of zoning by-laws, this duty of neutrality 
means that municipalities must structure their regulations “in such a way 
as to avoid placing unnecessary obstacles in the way of the exercise of 
religious freedoms”, but need not “provide assistance of any kind to 
religious groups or actively help them resolve any difficulties they might 
encounter in their negotiations with third parties in relation to plans to 
establish a place of worship.”94 
Justice LeBel went on to opine on what the municipality’s duty of 
religious neutrality would have required had there been no land available 
for purchase in an appropriately zoned area. He reasoned that “[f]reedom 
of religion includes the right to have a place of worship” because “[s]uch 
facilities allow individuals to declare their religious beliefs, to manifest 
them and, quite simply, to practise their religion by worship, as well as to 
teach or disseminate it.”95 The inability to construct a house of worship 
would amount to an infringement of the religious freedom right not “solely 
                                                                                                                       
91  Id., at para. 66. 
92  Id., at para. 67. 
93  Id., at para. 68. 
94  Id., at para. 71. 
95  Id., at para. 73. 
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attributable to the property owners who had refused to sell their land”. 
Rather, the infringement would “result not from the existence of the zoning 
by-law, but from the refusal to adapt it to evolving community needs in a 
situation in which no land was available in the zone set aside for the 
establishment of places of worship”.96 The difficulty in such cases resides 
in reconciling the state’s duty of neutrality with the recognition that “there 
may be situations in which an absolute application of this principle unduly 
restricts the free exercise of religion”.97 In other words, context is crucial. 
Where it would be impossible for a group to establish a house of worship, 
“freedom of religion can have no real meaning unless the public authorities 
take positive action”,98 i.e., amend the zoning by-law.  
Sarah Morales argues that LeBel J.’s dissent ought to have been 
applied in the Ktunaxa case.99 We agree, and without duplicating her 
analysis, we offer the following additional justifications for the adoption 
of this view. First, LeBel J.’s general discussion of the duty of religious 
neutrality has been relied upon by a majority of the Court,100 and his 
conclusion flows quite directly from this discussion. Second, there is 
support in the case law for the proposition that a municipal board faced 
with an appeal of a zoning by-law is required to consider the 
constitutional right of religious freedom in its deliberation,101 and this is 
consistent with the current approach to constitutional rights in the 
administrative context.102 Third, LeBel J.’s analysis of zoning disputes 
was later applied by the Québec Court of Appeal in Congregation of the 
Followers of the Rabbis of Belz to Strengthen Torah c. Val-Morin 
(Municipalité de), giving it additional authority.103  
Applying LeBel J.’s logic to the Ktunaxa facts helps put the case in a 
different light. Just as LeBel J. asked whether there was land available to 
meet the needs of the Jehovah’s Witness community in Lafontaine,  
we might ask whether there is alternate land to meet the needs of the 
                                                                                                                       
96  Id., at paras. 75-76. 
97  Id. 
98  Id., at para. 79. At para. 81, LeBel J. was careful to note that while the Court could have 
“ordered the municipality to amend its zoning by-law, but we could not have imposed on the 
municipality our choice of location for the establishment of the appellants’ place of worship … the only 
possible remedy that would have been appropriate was an order to the municipality to review its zoning 
by-law so as to make land available to the appellants on which they could build their place of worship.” 
99  Sarah Morales, “Qat’Muk: Ktunaxa and the Religious Freedom of Indigenous 
Canadians” [hereinafter “Morales”] in Newman, supra, note 5, 287, at 295-96. 
100  Saguenay, supra, note 78, at paras. 71-72. 
101  Grushman v. Ottawa (City), [2000] O.J. No. 4444, 29 Admin L.R. (3d) 41 (Ont. Div. Ct.). 
102  Doré, supra, note 89; Loyola, supra, note 73. 
103  [2008] J.Q. no 2459, 2008 QCCA 577 (Que. C.A.). 
226 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2019) 88 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
Ktunaxa Nation. Given the centrality of Grizzly Bear Spirit to the 
Ktunaxa Nation’s spiritual practice and the claim that the Grizzly Bear 
Spirit lives in Qat’muk and will leave if anyone overnights in the area, it 
is hard to see how any other land could be suitable for the Ktunaxa 
Nation’s spiritual purposes. Unless one takes the view that the Ktunaxa 
claim is insincere, which none of the courts in this case found, the 
religious freedom claim should have been made out on the parameters set 
by LeBel J.104 Moreover, in LeBel J.’s approach, there is room for the 
law to account for historical context and what interpretations of the right 
might lead to the state making it impossible for a group to practice their 
religion. And where the ability to engage meaningfully in a set of 
religious practices is completely negated, we are not convinced that the 
right of religious freedom has been proportionately balanced against the 
legislative objectives, or minimally impaired. We concede, however, that 
on current framings of section 1105 or proportionate balancing,106 there is 
more room for argument on this score. Our main concern in this paper 
has been to focus on the scope of the Charter right rather than the 
justification for its infringement. 
IV. INHERENT PROBLEMS WITH THE “SPIRITUAL FOCAL  
POINT OF WORSHIP” TEST 
In addition to the likely disproportionate impacts on Indigenous 
communities of the Ktunaxa decision, the exclusion of “spiritual focal 
points of worship” from section 2(a)’s protection raises challenges for 
some non-Indigenous spiritual practices. Consider, for example, the 
Christian Eucharist. The Eucharist commemorates the Last Supper of 
Christ. Christian ritual commemorates this meal through a breaking of 
bread, yet the commemoration has different meanings to different sects 
of Christianity. It is an article of faith among Catholics that the 
Eucharistic bread transubstantiates into the body of Christ, and that the 
Eucharist becomes the Real Presence of Christ, i.e., the spiritual focal 
point of worship. 
Generally, for Protestant sects of Christianity, the Eucharist is only a 
symbolic commemoration of the Last Supper, and there is no doctrine of 
                                                                                                                       
104  Morales takes the same view: supra, note 99, at 296. 
105  Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, [2009] S.C.J. No. 37, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 
567 (S.C.C.). 
106  Doré, supra, note 89. 
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transubstantiation. One might therefore conclude that the Eucharist is not 
a “focal point of worship” for Protestants, while it is for Catholics. If this 
is so, it would seem that the logic of the Ktunaxa majority leads to the 
conclusion that the Eucharist is protected by section 2(a) for Protestants 
but not for Catholics. This is a paradoxical result, and we suggest this 
illustrates the difficulty of the “focal point of worship” test. Indeed, in 
using this as a test for what falls within section 2(a)’s protection, the 
majority of the Court seems to interject Canadian law precisely into the 
very theological inquiries it has sought to avoid. 
These paradoxical and counterintuitive impacts to us suggest that the 
majority of the Court has set out a test that will be difficult to apply. 
What’s more, if the majority is concerned with religious freedom 
acquiring dimensions of a property right, that ship seems to have already 
sailed, at least in Quebec, where religious freedom is protected as 
between private parties. Amselem was a dispute among co-owners of a 
condominium-style complex in which balconies and terraces were 
allocated to the common portions. That the claimants in Amselem were 
allowed to erect their succoth on their balconies and terraces certainly 
had an impact on the property rights of others. One might argue that the 
impact on the co-owners was small, but the point is that the ritual was 
still protected even though it implicated property rights; that some 
infringements may be justified and others not is a separate question 
reserved for the proportionality analysis stage. Outside Quebec, the case 
law on zoning regulation discussed above provides another avenue by 
which the property rights of third parties can be affected. If the concern 
with recognizing certain religious freedom rights is the impact on others, 
the proportionality analysis is the correct place for the balancing of those 
interests,107 rather than foreclosing the recognition of those rights at the 
first stage of the test.108 
V. ANOTHER PATH FORWARD: A TREATY RELATIONSHIP 
Reading both sets of reasons of the Supreme Court in Ktunaxa, one 
gets the sense that the conflict between Indigenous spiritual values and 
the interests of the Canadian state are somehow incommensurable, that 
                                                                                                                       
107  A similar balancing test is used where the religious freedom right conflicts with other 
constitutional rights: see R. v. S. (N.), [2012] S.C.J. No. 47, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 726, at para. 7 (S.C.C.). 
108  Bakht & Collins, supra, note 7, at 781 argue that “the approval of commercial or 
industrial development on an Aboriginal sacred site without consent and compensation will 
generally be unjustifiable under section 1”. 
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conflicts between the two are inevitable. It is helpful at these junctures to 
recall a time-honoured vehicle for peaceable land-sharing between 
Indigenous people and settlers: the treaty relationship. For example, in 
Upper Canada Treaty 82, the Chippewas of Nawash Unceded First 
Nation convinced the Crown to agree that their burial ground adjacent to 
the city of Owen Sound should be protected as a reserve.109 Modern 
treaties have taken a more systematic approach. During treaty 
negotiations, which generally last years or decades, there is a land 
selection process by which the Indigenous community chooses certain 
lands to own in fee simple, while a larger portion of the land is 
designated as being subject to a co-management regime between the 
community and Crown governments.110 The drawn out land selection 
period allows for a community to identify lands with important spiritual 
interests that it elects to own in fee simple. This then would place the 
Indigenous sacred place at a similar level of protection as settler religious 
lands protected under fee simple. Unfortunately, in our view, Ktunaxa 
has weakened the negotiating position of Indigenous groups with 
spiritual attachments to the land, or at least forces them to articulate that 
attachment within the strictures of the jurisprudence under section 35 of 
the Constitution Act, 1982 instead of under the Charter.111  
Such thoughtful land selection negotiations have, by and large, not 
been a feature of how the Crown conducted historical treaty negotiations. 
And such a measured approach would have been a rare exception in the 
areas of Canada without treaties, such as most of British Columbia, 
where colonial governments operated as if the land was terra nullius.  
An urgent process of treaty renewal in the historical treaty areas, and 
treaty negotiation in the untreated areas, would set us on a course away 
from painful conflicts of the kind we saw in Ktunaxa Nation.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The changes to the law of religious freedom in Ktunaxa are significant. 
We have argued that the new limits on religious freedom will be experienced 
disproportionately by Indigenous groups. One way religious groups can deal 
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with this newly constrained religious freedom right is by relying more 
heavily on their rights of property. In the historical context of land grants to 
Catholic and Protestant groups, facilitated by the dispossession of 
Indigenous groups, settler religions, especially majoritarian ones, are less 
likely to need Charter protection for their sacred places. We think this is 
inconsistent with the Charter’s underlying commitments to equal human 
dignity and multiculturalism. Moreover, we think that the changes in the law 
will be likely to pass mostly under the radar. If Indigenous groups shift their 
litigation strategies away from religious freedom, there will simply not be 
cases that demonstrate the problems wrought by the decision. 
 
 
